Equally important in the S&L crisis was a much tougher framework of banking laws, according to Black, who is critical of the deregulation that began during the Clinton administration.
I responded in my comment that:
The quotation at the end that the reporter attributes to me was actually me quoting the famous concluding paragraph of George Akerlof and Paul Romer's 1993 article entitled 'Looting: the Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.'
"Neither the public nor economists foresaw that [S&L deregulation was] bound to produce looting. Nor, unaware of the concept, could they have known how serious it would be. Thus the regulators in the field who understood what was happening from the beginning found lukewarm support, at best, for their cause. Now we know better. If we learn from experience, history need not repeat itself" (George Akerlof & Paul Romer.1993: 60.The second statement in the Frontline article that I commented reads:
One key tool used during the S&L crisis was criminal referrals from regulators to government prosecutors, explained William Black, who served as the government's point man for litigation in the S&L crisis. Such referrals 'are absolutely essential,' said Black, because they provide a road map for a Justice Department already short-staffed in the area of white-collar crime. According to Black, criminal referrals have been missing in the response to the 2008 crisis.
Curry said bank regulators were more focused on getting problems corrected rather than criminal penalties. 'From our standpoint, as a bank regulatory agency, our job is to, one, identify the problems and then mandate that they get fixed,' he said. 'I don't think it's our role to avenge or to punish per se.'